Do investors have to be rational for the market prices to be efficient? Statistical analysis of the interest rate forecasts published in The Wall Street Journal since 1981 suggests that investors do not need to be rational for the market prices to be efficient. A market inhabited by imperfect agents can be efficient if the agents are numerous and suitably interconnected. In this market, multiplicity and interaction compensate for individual imperfections. The paper examines a large ensemble of irrational investors who interact through market prices. A maximum-likelihood model of The Wall Street Journal polls agrees with the actual distribution of forecasts. From the practical viewpoint, if price efficiency is independent of individual rationality, then passive index investing dominates active investing irrespective of investors' behavioral biases.
… before we can explain why people commit mistakes, we must first explain why they should ever be right.
Friedrich A. von Hayek Economics and Knowledge 1937 1 Introduction
Individual rationality lies at the heart of neoclassical economics. For example, both the rational expectations hypothesis in macroeconomics and the efficient market hypothesis in financial economics are rooted in individual rationality; see, e.g., Fama (1970 Fama ( , 1998 . Empirical evidence though suggests that investors often act irrationally; see, e.g., Benartzi and Thaler (2001) , Black (1986) , Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , Odean (1998) . If investors are not rational then, some argue, market prices are not efficient; see, e.g., Shiller (2000) and Shleifer (2000) .
The thesis of this paper is that investors do not need to be rational for the market prices to be efficient. This paper provides both empirical evidence and a theoretical model of an efficient capital market inhabited by irrational investors.
The empirical evidence is based on the interest rate forecasts of the leading Wall Street economists, published in The Wall Street Journal since 1981. On the one hand, the prevailing spot rates are better predictors of the future interest rates than the experts. This conclusion supports the efficient market hypothesis. On the other hand, the experts routinely deviate from a superior forecast, the spot rate, and make inferior predictions instead. This behavior is irrational because it ignores useful market information. 1 This evidence suggests that price efficiency is not necessarily a product of individual rationality. A system comprised of a large number of primitive and imperfect components is able to perform intelligent and reliable functions if the individual components interact and work in concert. Likewise, a securities market inhabited by imperfect investors can function efficiently if the investors communicate and coordinate their decisions.
According to Hayek (1937) , investors communicate and coordinate their decisions through market prices. According to Georgescu-Roegen (1970) , the communication through prices is subject to the Oedipus effect: investors observe market prices and then randomly revise their expectations. As a result, investors hold diverse expectations even after observing a superior forecast.
The paper presents a maximum-likelihood model of an efficient market populated by irrational heterogeneous investors. The model produces a distribution of interest rate forecasts that agrees with The Wall Street Journal poll. The model also entails the absence of arbitrage, the CAPM, APT and Black-Scholes (Gulko 1999) . Therefore, the financial theory and practice predicated on the efficient market hypothesis, e.g., index investing, are valid whether or not investors act rationally. Malkiel (2003) offers empirical evidence in support of this view.
Empirical Evidence
The Wall Street Journal has published semiannual interest rate forecasts of the leading Wall Street economists since December 1981. On the last business day of every June and December, the economists have made predictions of the 3-month and 30-year interest rates six months into the future. The individual forecasts have been published in the beginning of July and January following the forecast. This section documents statistical properties of the forecasts. Suppose that at time t the spot rate is r t and six month later at time t+1 the spot rate is r t+1 . At time t, I t experts observe the spot rate r t and make predictions of the future spot rate r t+1 . Let f ti be the individual forecast of expert i at time t. The consensus forecast f t at time t is defined as the average
Forecast Samples Over Time
In theory, the spot rate r t absorbs all available information about future interest rates. Hence, r t represents a naïve market forecast of the future interest rate r t+1 . In order to evaluate the accuracy of the experts' consensus forecast f t relative to the naïve market forecast r t , the following forecast model is estimated by linear regression.
where the historical record of interest rates r t and r t+1 is obtained from Bloomberg; the consensus forecast f t comes from The Wall Street Journal; coefficients α and β are estimated by regression, and ε is a normal random error with zero mean. This forecast model is similar to the one in Muth (1961) , except it assumes that the experts use the current spot rate as the reference point. In other words, the forecast model is based on the hypothesis that the experts observe the spot rate r t and then adjust it by their consensus outlook (f t − r t ). If this hypothesis is correct then the α-estimate is approximately one and the β-estimate determines the accuracy of the experts' foresight as follows. If α=1 and β>0, then the experts are correct, on average, about the direction of interest rates. If α=1 and β=0, then the experts' consensus has zero predictive value. If α=1 and β<0, then the experts are wrong, on average, about the direction of interest rates. Exhibit 2 presents the regression estimates of α and β. The α-estimate is approximately 1 for the forecasts of both 3-month rates and 30-year rates, thus confirming that the experts use the spot rate r t as a reference point when forming their consensus (f t − r t ). In the forecast of the 3-month rate, the β-estimate is statistically indistinguishable from 0. Therefore, the experts as a group are no more informative than the spot rate r t , and their consensus view has no predictive value.
In the forecast of the 30-year rate, the β-estimate is negative. Therefore, the experts are generally wrong about the direction of the 30-year interest rate. It is more beneficial to act contrary to their consensus views than to follow them. The regression results do not imply that the current spot is a good predictor of the future interest rate; they only imply that the current spot is a better predictor than the experts.
Next, examine the properties of individual forecasts. Let the relative forecast at time t be the difference between a forecast made at time t and the prevailing spot rate r t . For example, f ti −r t is the relative individual forecast of expert i at time t, and f t −r t is the relative consensus forecast at time t.
Exhibit 3 shows the time series of the descriptive statistics for the relative individual forecasts f ti −r t . The thick solid line plots the relative consensus forecast f t −r t . The two thin solid lines above and below f t −r t demarcate the band (f t −r t )±σ t , where σ t is the standard deviation of the relative individual forecasts f ti −r t at time t. The two dotted lines mark the largest and the smallest values of f ti −r t at time t. The vertical distance between the dotted lines measures the range of individual forecasts at time t. This range often exceeds 2%. Large deviations of the individual forecasts from the prevailing spot rate have persisted over time little affected by the level of interest rates. As the interest rates have declined from the double digits in the early 1980s to the low single digits in 2002, the range of individual forecasts has remained around 2% since the mid-1980s.
While the experts hold diverse individual outlooks f ti , their consensus forecast f t tends to converge to the prevailing spot rate r t . Exhibit 3 shows that the relative consensus forecast f t −r t , represented by the thick solid line, is close to zero most of time for both 3-month interest rates and 30-year interest rates.
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The Std Deviation of (f ti − r t ) The cross-sectional statistics in Exhibit 4 confirm these tendencies. The mean of f ti −r t is well under 10 bps and standard deviation is over 50 bps for both 3-month rates and 30-year rates. This means that the experts hold highly diverse views, while their consensus closely matches the prevailing spot. The following three observations summarize the empirical evidence. Observation 1. The experts' consensus forecast has no predictive value and the spot rate r t is a better predictor of the future spot rate r t+1 than the experts' consensus.
Observation 2. The experts' consensus forecast f t tends to the prevailing spot rate r t .
Observation 3. Individual forecasts f ti have a large dispersion around the spot rate r t .
Implications
The empirical study in the last section supports both price efficiency and individual irrationality. Investors are said to be rational only if they fully utilize available information and irrational if they do not fully utilize available information.
2 Market prices are said to be efficient only if they are not predictable and inefficient if they are predictable. According to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), market prices reflect all available information; hence, it is impossible to consistently anticipate price changes (Fama 1970 (Fama , 1998 .
By Observation 1, the experts as a group display no predictive ability and the prevailing spot rates are more informative than the experts' consensus. By Observation 2, the experts' consensus forecast of the future rates tends to the prevailing spot rate, meaning that the spot rate aggregates the experts' expectations before they are reported to The Wall Street Journal. This evidence is consistent with the EMH and modern financial theory.
Therefore, an educated forecast must be close to the prevailing spot. Yet, by Observation 3, individual forecasts f ti often fall far away from the prevailing spot rate r t . This means that the experts observe the spot, known to be a superior forecast, and then issue inferior forecasts. The experts act irrationally as they ignore useful market information. Aggarwal et al (1995) and Schirm (2003) also find − using different criteria − that economic forecasts often lack rationality.
Although the definition of price efficiency does not involve individual rationality, it is usually assumed that price efficiency is a product of individual rationality. Furthermore, any evidence against investors' rationality automatically serves as evidence against the EMH. However, Observations 1, 2 and 3 suggest that price efficiency and individual irrationality are not necessarily mutually exclusive -they may co-exist in the same market. Then individuals do not need to be rational for the market prices to be efficient.
How do the prices reach efficiency if investors are not rational? Complex systems with imperfect components can function properly if the components are interconnected so that the flaws are detected and corrected endogenously. Redundant relay networks and the human nervous system are examples of well-functioning systems with imperfect components.
Both the relay networks and the human nervous system consist of a large number of primitive elements -binary relays and neurons, respectively -interconnected so that, even if some of them fail, the entire system may still function flawlessly. What makes these systems intelligent and reliable is not the perfection of individual components but the multiplicity and interaction of primitive and imperfect components acting in concert.
Likewise, a securities market is an information-processing system consisting of a large ensemble of imperfect elements. What makes the market system efficient is not the high quality of individual elements but, instead, the multiplicity and interaction of low-quality elements. In this market, price efficiency is not a product of individual knowledge and intelligence; instead, it is a product of coordinated actions of many imperfect agents.
Investors communicate and coordinate their decisions via the price system (Hayek 1945) . The communication protocol consists of three steps. First, investors receive messages by observing market prices. Second, investors use the prices to revise their expectations and valuations. Third, they send messages in the form of buy orders, sell orders or no orders. Steps one and three are self-explanatory. In order to examine how investors revise their expectations, let us consider Observation 3.
Why do the experts deviate from the spot rate r t that represents a superior forecast? This paradox can be explained by the Oedipus effect: individuals revise their views and actions after they observe the actions of others; the revisions are unpredictable and often contradict the actions observed. As a result, individuals draw different conclusions from the same evidence. Georgescu-Roegen (1971, p. 335) was the first to recognize this effect in economics:
"… the Oedipus effect … boils down to this: the announcement of an action to be taken changes the evidence upon which each individual bases his expectations and, hence, causes him to revise his previous plans. Preferences too may be subject to an Oedipus effect. One may prefer a Rolls Royce to a Cadillac but perhaps not if he is told that his neighbor, too, will buy a Rolls Royce." Likewise, The Wall Street Journal forecasters observe the spot rate r t and then deviate from it, even though they are aware of the informational superiority of market prices and of the verifiable inferiority of the experts' forecasts. The deviations are random both in size and in direction. This leads to a large dispersion of the forecasts and the apparent disagreement among the experts. The result is the experts, homogeneous in terms of their professional backgrounds, experiences and information sets, make highly heterogeneous predictions.
The Oedipus effect reflects a simple fact that competitive individuals tend to disagree with each other. Therefore, investors always hold diverse views. As the non-satiation, or greed, is an intrinsic individual property that fuels competition, the diversity of individual views is an intrinsic group property that enables competition. No economic competition is possible unless individuals want more than what they own and think differently than others.
In contrast, textbook models usually assume that investors share the same views. As a result, these models run into a dilemma known as the no-trade theorem and discussed in Ross (1987) . According to the no-trade theorem, investors sharing the same expectations never trade. This absurd conclusion is indicative of flawed assumptions. Financial models with heterogeneous beliefs do not suffer from this problem.
Maximum-Likelihood Model
This section presents a statistical model of The Wall Street Journal polls. At time t, N experts observe the spot rate r t and make predictions of the future rate r t+1 . Let S be a random variable representing the relative individual forecast, i.e., the deviation of the individual forecast from the prevailing spot rate r t . The objective is to construct a maximum-likelihood distribution of the relative individual forecast S.
First, suppose that S takes on m=41 possible values S k , k=1, 2, …, 41, uniformly spaced between -2.0% and +2.0%. These values comprise the state space Ω, Ω = {-2.0%, -1.9%, -1.8%, …, -0.1%, 0%, 0.1%, …, 1.8%, 1.9%, 2.0%} Each forecaster makes a prediction by selecting one state S k , k=1, 2, …, m. Suppose that n k forecasters select state S k . Then vector (n 1 , n 2 , …, n m ), n 1 +n 2 +…+n m =N, represents a distribution of forecasts on the state space Ω. Let p i =n i /N, k=1, 2, …, m. The forecast poll induces a probability distribution p≡(p 1 , p 2 , …, p m ) on Ω.
Second, assume that market prices are efficient. Then the prevailing spot rate aggregates all relevant information, and the consensus forecast of a large group of experts tends to the prevailing spot rate. Therefore, the relative individual forecast S has a zero mean, Σ p k S k = 0. This condition is consistent with empirical Observation 2. The maximum-likelihood model assumes that market prices are efficient and that investors hold heterogeneous expectations. The model does not rely on individual rationality. On the contrary, the investors are represented by pin balls and, therefore, lack any intelligence or rationality. While economic models usually assume that investors are perfectly rational, the maximum-likelihood model goes to the other extreme and effectively assumes that the investors have zero intelligence. Farmer (2003) argues that it is fruitful to explore both extremes. It is generally accepted in the finance literature that the presence of rational traders is necessary in order to attain price efficiency. For example, Black (1986) proposes a market model with two types of traders. One type are the irrational noise traders who help the market liquidity but not the price discovery; and the second type are the rational informed traders who carry out the price discovery and maintain efficient pricing. In contrast, we suggest that efficient pricing can be achieved even when all traders are irrational.
Interpretation
We interpret the likelihood function H(p)≡−∑ p k log p k as an index of collective market uncertainty about the next price change. Efficient market prices keep investors in the state of maximum uncertainty about the next price change. If H(p) indexes the collective uncertainty, then in efficient markets H(p) must be at its maximum. Therefore, maximizing the likelihood function H(p) amounts to seeking a probability belief that is consistent with the EMH.
In Exhibit 4, the median relative forecast is near zero, meaning that on average 50% of the forecasters expect the rates to rise and 50% expect the rates to fall. A random variable with two outcomes attains the maximum uncertainly when the two outcomes occur with probability 50/50. Therefore, on average, the spot rates keep the experts in the state of maximum uncertainty about the next up/down shift. Also, the two-state likelihood function p 1 ⋅log p 1 + p 2 ⋅log p 2 reaches maximum when p 1 =p 2 =0.5.
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The real line Exhibit 6. The market uncertainty index H(p) is a map from the set of plausible consensus beliefs p to the real line. Efficient prices maximize the uncertainty index H(p).
The uncertainty index H(p) is a map from the set of plausible probability distributions to the real line, Exhibit 6. The plausible distributions should reflect all relevant consensus information I. In the last section, the information set I is specified by the mean and variance constraints for the random relative forecast S. The maximum-likelihood probability distribution maximizes the collective uncertainty conditional on the consensus information I.
The maximum-likelihood model represents a statistical filter for inferring the collective market beliefs from the consensus information set I. A different information set I results in a different maximum-likelihood probability belief. In particular, if the information set I contains market prices, then the model filters the collective expectations out of the prices.
The maximum-likelihood model is consistent with modern financial theory. Gulko (1999) shows that the model entails the absence of arbitrage, the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the Arbitrage Pricing Theory and the Black-Scholes stock option pricing model without relying on complete markets, homogeneous beliefs or rational, utility-maximizing investors. Thus, the maximum-likelihood model extends modern valuation theory to incomplete markets inhabited by irrational investors with heterogeneous expectations.
A major practical implication of modern financial theory is the superiority of passive index investing over active investing. If the theory is independent of investors' rationality, then index investing is a superior long-term strategy whether or not investors act rationally. At the same time, active investment strategies, designed to profit from irrational investor behavior, might be a red herring. Malkiel (2003) supports this viewpoint with some empirical evidence.
We conclude by noting that the maximum-likelihood model captures the central themes of the capital market described in Hayek (1937 Hayek ( , 1945 . First, the Hayek market represents a "spontaneous order" rather than equilibrium. The spontaneous order is a product of random and fuzzy interaction of numerous heterogeneous agents. The spontaneous order − as well as the entire market activity − is governed by random chance rather than design, by ambiguity rather than deterministic relations such as, for example, the equality of supply and demand.
"… the concept of equilibrium itself and the methods which we employ in pure analysis have a clear meaning only when confined to the analysis of the action of a single person and that we are really passing into a different sphere and silently introducing a new element of altogether different character when we apply it to the explanation of the interactions of a number of different individuals". Hayek (1937) .
Next, investors in the Hayek market possess heterogeneous knowledge and heterogeneous expectations. No one has perfect information; instead, each one has only "bits of knowledge." Finally, the investors exchange information using market prices as a communication medium. Market prices aggregate the bits of limited individual knowledge and disseminate the aggregate information to everyone. As a result, the price system enables many imperfect heterogeneous agents to communicate and coordinate their actions in an efficient manner.
"The whole [economy] acts as one market not because any of its members survey the whole field but because their limited individual fields of vision overlap so that through many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all… [As a result, the market functions as] one single mind processing all the information which is in fact dispersed among all the people involved in the process… We must look at the price system as such a mechanism for communicating information … The most significant fact about this system is the economy of knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to know in order to be able to take the right action." Hayek (1945) If the market functions as "one single mind" then a suitable market model can be analogous to a neural-network model of the human brain. In particular, statistical methods used to study neural networks may also be useful for studying the random and spontaneous activity, taking place in capital markets. The maximum-likelihood model of the interest rate forecasts provides a concrete example.
Conclusion
The conventional wisdom suggests that informational efficiency of market prices is a product of individual rationality. The thesis of this paper is that investors do not need to be rational for the market prices to be efficient. The empirical study of the interest-rate forecasts published in The Wall Street Journal implies that, on the one hand, the economic experts act irrationally as they ignore useful information. On the other hand, the market prices are more informative than the experts. Hence, price efficiency and individual irrationality are not mutually exclusive, and price efficiency is not necessarily a product of individual rationality.
A capital market inhabited by irrational investors is able to function efficiently if the investors communicate and coordinate their actions. According to Hayek (1937) , investors communicate and coordinate their decisions through market prices. According to GeorgescuRoegen (1970) , the communication and coordination through prices is subject to the Oedipus effect: investors observe market prices and then randomly revise their expectations. As a consequence, investors may hold highly diverse expectations even in the presence of an observable superior forecast.
The paper presents a maximum-likelihood model of an efficient market populated by irrational investors. The model produces a distribution of the interest rate forecasts that agrees with The Wall Street Journal polls. Furthermore, the model represents a formal expression of the efficient market hypothesis and extends modern valuation theory to the markets with irrational investors. A practical implication is that passive indexing is superior to active investing irrespective of investors' rationality while the active strategies, designed to profit from behavioral biases, might not measure up to their promise. If the variance constraint is not binding then λ 2 =0 and the solution is a uniform distribution on Ω. In this case, the variance of S is (1/m)Σ k S k 2 = (1.18%) 2 . Therefore, if M≥1.18% then the variance constraint is not binding, and the solution is the uniform distribution on Ω. If M<1.18% then the variance constraint is binding and the solution is a discrete normal distribution on Ω.
